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Abstract  
This paper reviews the New Public Management (NPM) literature on the effects of the 
creation and ongoing operations of agencies across European public sectors. It finds that the 
bulk of evidence concerns internal effects on processes/activities of agency creation and 
management and little evidence on outputs and outcomes. The article identifies a number of 
patterns across the sample reviewed and finds positive effects on improved processes, and an 
orientation towards results and service users’ needs. Similarly, it finds improvements in 
transparency and accountability across various countries, but evidence in these areas is less 
clear. It finds that 46% of the studies included in the sample identified concerns about 
fragmentation, coordination or organizational stability and shows that unintended 
consequences are an important part of the evaluation of the effects of agencification. The 
paper argues that the picture of the effects of agencies is nuanced and discusses possible 
factors that can tip the balance for or against the success of the agency model.     
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Introduction 
 
The creation of agencies has been at the core of the New Public Management (NPM).  Much 
has been written on and commented about the suitability, advantages and problems of hiving 
off public tasks. It might therefore be expected that the effects of the creation and ongoing 
operations of agencies are well understood. However, whether agencification ‘works’, and 
the circumstances under which it does, are still unfinished tasks (Manning and Matsuda, 
2000; Verhoest et al., 2012). This article reviews the NPM literature on agencies across 
European public sectors to identify possible patterns in the success or failure of the agency 
model. It does so by analysing ‘internal’ effects on the processes or activities of agencies as 
well as effects on outputs and outcomes.  
To ask what the effects of agencification have been may seem like a straightforward question, 
but actually it is anything but. There are two principal groups of reasons why it is hard to 
answer: the first have to do with meaning and the second with evidence. The terms ‘agency’ 
and ‘effects’ have both been used with a range of meanings, so we have to be careful to 
specify what it is we are talking about at any particular point.  
On the question of meanings, we may note that it has long been recognised that there is no 
standardized international view of what is an ‘agency’ (Pollitt et al., 2004; Pollitt and Talbot, 
2004; Verhoest et al., 2012, pp. 18-21). There is no widely shared legal or constitutional 
category that ensures that (say) the British, the Dutch, the French and the Germans are all 
talking about the same thing. Neither is the cultural and political meaning of agencification 
similar in all countries or periods. For example, a detailed study of key official documents on 
agencification in Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden came to the conclusion that debates 
about why agencification was necessary and what it meant were quite different in each case 
(Smullen, 2010). Or again, during the 1990s in the UK, agencification was widely seen as 
giving blocks of operational activity more autonomy from ministries, while in the 
Netherlands one current of thought was that agencification was attractive because it placed 
such activities under closer ministerial supervision than would putting them into the then 
popular ZBO format (Van Thiel and Pollitt, 2007). A study of agencies operating in the same 
sectors in Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK showed that even where agencies 
had similar performance indicator systems, the status of these systems and the ways in which 
they were used varied considerably (Pollitt et al., 2004). This means that international lesson 
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drawing is difficult, because similar-looking organizational structures or performance 
management systems may actually be operated in different ways.  
 
Theoretical background 
Scholars have repeatedly stressed that there was not one single coherent theory that fed into 
the NPM (Kettl, 1997). Nevertheless, economic theories, typically neo-classical and rational 
choice, are often considered to form the core of the theoretical basis of NPM. This includes 
public choice theory (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1968; 1971; see also Boyne et al., 2003 for an 
application to public services in the UK), principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
see also Buchanan, 1988; Verhoest, 2005), managerialism (Pollitt, 1993) or property rights 
theory (for example Preker and Harding, 2003). This has been contrasted with general 
management theory which tends to take a more heroic view of managers – as leaders who can 
‘transform’ their organizations, and who can change the organizational culture.  So for this 
reason more autonomy – freedom for managers to manage – is seen as a good idea.  Rational 
choice has very little to do with/say about cultural change, leadership and all the things which 
concern generic management theory.  It takes a more narrowly self-interested view of 
motivation. The key expectation of these theories is that autonomous organizations are 
uniquely positioned to deliver performance – if only they were equipped with the proper 
incentives. The proponents of agencification were sometimes quite vague about exactly what 
agencification was supposed to achieve (for example Van Thiel, 2001). On other occasions, 
however, a variety of positive claims were made. It was assumed that executive agencies 
need to enjoy a certain degree of discretion so that decisions can be made on the basis of 
specialized expertise and customer preferences. Therefore allocative efficiency was presumed 
to improve following specialization and disaggregation of monolithic entities. Technical 
efficiency of operations was likewise believed to go up. A flexible service delivery 
organization is expected to be in a better position to innovate constantly and find cost-
effective and creative solutions to improve quality, address financial problems and adapt to 
changing patterns of demand. As a result public accountability and user/customer satisfaction 
are expected to get better. If management is empowered with the adequate decision-making 
capacity, it can motivate personnel by designing tailored incentives, which in turn are 
expected to lead to performance improvements. An expanded choice of services and 
maintained equity are two additional expected benefits. The overall expectation was that 
performance of executive agencies would improve without a significant decrease in equity or 
access to services. These have been the main expectations of the creation of agencies. Other 
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issues such as fragmentation, coordination and their implications for systemic performance 
and policy coherence were not part of the original model. Weight was placed mainly on the 
performance of operations at unit level measured by the production of outputs (Schick, 1996). 
In this article we adopt what has become a fairly standard definition of an agency (Van Thiel, 
2012, pp. 18-20). The definition employed in this paper treats an agency as a public sector 
organization which is: 
1. Structurally disaggregated from government ministries 
2. Operates under more businesslike conditions than the core government bureaucracy 
Such organizations operate at arms’ length from the core of government and undertake public 
tasks such as service delivery, regulation and policy implementation. 
This article distinguishes between three types of effects: 
1. Activities/processes (for example budgeting, making accountability statements; 
organising to produce services; training staff) 
2. Outputs (for example treatments/lessons/inspection/information delivered to service 
users; grants and loans issued)  
3. Outcomes (for example improved health status for citizens; better economic growth; 
educational attainments for students; increased citizen satisfaction with the quality of 
services) 
An organization or programme is conceived as a set of activities or processes. These include 
organizational arrangements like the division of responsibility, the allocation of authority, the 
standard operating procedures, and so on. These procedures enable the organization to deploy 
and redeploy its resources (staff, money, buildings and so forth) which are collectively 
termed inputs. From these activities and processes the organization or programme then 
produces a set of outputs, which could, for example be lessons (in a school), licenses (from a 
licensing agency), medical treatments (from a hospital) and so on. These outputs are, in a 
sense, what the organization ‘gives’ to the outside world – to citizens, to civil society 
associations and to business firms. They are like messages, passing across the membrane that 
separates (on the one hand) the state from (on the other) the market sector and civil society. 
Outputs are invariably intended to produce desirable outcomes, beyond the organization or 
programme – so school lessons are supposed to produce educated students and hospital-
provided medical treatments are supposed to produce the cure or the alleviation of ill-health. 
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An outcome is something that happens in the world outside the organization and the 
programme: it is an effect ‘out there in the real world’.  
The performance of organizations and programmes (the value of their activities) is usually 
thought of in terms of certain relationships between these inputs, outputs and outcomes. Thus 
the ratio between inputs and outputs is a measure of efficiency (or technical efficiency or X-
efficiency, or productivity). If you can get more outputs for the same inputs, you have 
achieved an efficiency gain. If you can maintain steady outputs while reducing inputs you 
have also achieved an efficiency gain – in both cases the ratio between inputs and outputs 
improves. Effectiveness, however, is a different concept, which is usually conceived as the 
degree to which the outcomes match the original goals or objectives set for the organization 
of programme. As many writers have remarked, if goals are multiple, conflicting or 
ambiguous then it will be difficult to determine effectiveness, which will, in effect, become a 
‘contested concept’. Unfortunately, policy goals frequently are multiple, conflicting or 
ambiguous, not least because that is what politicians may need to get sufficient agreement to 
launch the policy in the first place. This certainly includes public management reforms which 
are often claimed to be all things to all men – to save money, raise service quality, increase 
effectiveness, and so forth. 
Another point to be borne in mind is that, increasingly, official reports and evaluations, as 
well as academic studies, make use of complex indices of performance, which combine two 
or more elements (see for example Audit Commission, 2009; Pollitt, 2011; Van de Walle et 
al., 2008). These aggregated indices can be very useful to busy decision makers or to non-
specialists and citizens, but they may also (deliberately or inadvertently) conceal underlying 
trades-off between two or more desirable values (for instance equity versus efficiency). They 
can also give spurious precision to judgments which are more correctly seen as hedged about 
by quite wide brackets of uncertainty (Jacobs and Goddard, 2007).  
When assessing effects there is also frequently a problem of attribution. That is to say, there 
may be evidence of, say, an increase in efficiency, but what exactly was the cause? If the 
creation of an agency structure was the only thing that happened during the relevant time 
period, then the efficiency gain might be plausibly attributed to that new structure. But if 
there were other developments at the same time (for example technological changes; a new 
management; a government-wide efficiency drive) then it can be very hard to assess what 
share of the efficiency gain (if any) should be attributed to agencification. This problem of 
multiple possible causes is actually very common in public management reform. And it tends 
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to get worse the further one moves from changes in processes to changes in outputs to 
changes in outcomes.  
 
Methods and data    
The studies of the effects of the creation and operations of agencies reviewed in this article 
are derived from a database of 519 studies of NPM reforms across Europe. The database was 
created as part of an international comparative project involving ten research teams in nine 
European countries (Pollitt and Dan, 2011; Pollitt and Dan, 2013)
1
. The process of 
identifying and selecting the studies followed the following steps (see Pollitt and Dan, 2011, 
pp. 17-19 for further details): 
a) Reviewed titles and keywords in articles published since 1980 (or later in case the first 
number of a journal appeared after 1980) in the following public administration and 
management journals: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public 
Administration, Governance, Public Administration Review, International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, International Public Management Journal, Public 
Management Review, Public Policy and Administration and Evaluation. The 
following keywords were used to guide the search: New Public Management (NPM), 
managerialism, performance, public sector reform, public management reform 
b) Read the abstract of those articles that satisfied step a) 
c) Submitted the articles that met step b) to a detailed review and made a decision for 
inclusion in the database on the basis of meeting cumulatively the following criteria:  
 The study includes an evaluation of NPM reforms that have already been launched 
 The NPM reforms have been partially or completely implemented and a formal 
ongoing or final evaluation has been conducted 
 The study makes claims about the effects of NPM, and it provides evidence to 
support those claims. 
 
Out of the total database, 72 studies refer to agencies in different countries across Europe 
(Table 1). The majority of these studies (74%) are academic, 10% consist of external and 
                                                          
1
 The database is available at http://www.cocops.eu/work-packages/wp1-npm-meta-analysis/database-of-
studies-of-npm-reforms-in-europe  
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independent formal evaluations while the rest are internal evaluations or general official 
policy documents with elements of evaluation (Table 2). These numbers indicate that the 
proportion of practitioner studies is rather small (10%) – the majority of the sample consists 
of independent academic work. A small fraction (7%) comprises studies by various 
international organizations such as the World Bank or the OECD. 
 Table 1. Countries covered 
Country Number of studies Percentage* 
Austria (AT) 6 8 
Belgium (BE) 6 8 
France (FR) 8 11 
Hungary (HU) 2 3 
Italy (IT) 6 8 
Latvia (LV) 2 3 
Lithuania (LT) 2 3 
Netherlands (NL) 11 15 
Norway (NO) 9 13 
Romania (RO) 2 3 
Sweden (SE) 2 3 
United Kingdom (UK) 7 10 
Comparative studies 12 17 
* Percentage of the total 72 studies of agencies.  
 
 
Table 2. Type of studies 
Type of study Number of studies Percentage* 
Academic 53 74 
General official policy reports with 
some elements of evaluation 
3 4 
Internal formal official evaluation 
studies 
4 6 
External and independent official 
evaluation studies 
7 10 
Other 5 7 
* Percentage of the total 72 studies of agencies.  
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A second step consisted of coding for each particular study the type of effects that were 
evaluated following the three-point typology introduced earlier: effects at the level of 
processes/activities, effects on outputs and effects on outcomes (see Table 3 below). The 
coding was implemented in Microsoft SharePoint which facilitated a count of each type of 
effect.  
A third step consisted of selecting a number of studies of the total number of 72 studies of 
agencies and report for each of these studies the specific effects found. This includes the 
direction of change – whether the creation of agencies led to improvements, deteriorations or 
no “significant” change. The primary criterion for selecting the studies for the detailed 
analysis included the strength of method and evidence provided followed by geographic 
reach in an attempt to include studies in different European countries. A total of 28 studies 
across Europe resulted from this selection process (see Table 4 below). The selection enabled 
a more detailed analysis of those studies that provided more convincing evidence while at the 
same ensuring that the sample consists of evaluations of the effects of the creation of 
agencies in different national contexts. Of the 28 studies, only 3 are practitioner while the rest 
of 25 are academic.  
 
Findings 
A first main finding is that the literature on the effects of agencification in Europe has been 
much more concerned with evaluating changes in processes/activities than with changes in 
outputs and outcomes. Table 3 shows that 36% of the studies (26 studies) found evidence on 
outputs or outcomes and of these only 7% on outcomes. As a result, much more is known 
about the internal machinery of setting up and managing agencies than about the effects that 
agencies and their services have on service users and citizens. Compared to what the citizens 
‘get’ as a result of agencification and how they are affected by it – outcomes – we know 
relatively more about what services agencies provide and how they provide them – outputs. 
This is reflected in Table 4 which shows specific examples of the effects of agencies. This is 
a first clear pattern to which the data point.   
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Table 3. Studies of agencies by type of effects 
Subset Number of studies  Percentage 
1. All studies of agencies 72 100 
2. All studies including entries for 
changes in activities/processes, 
outputs or outcomes 
53 74 
3. All studies including entries for 
changes in outputs or outcomes 
26 36 
4. All studies with entries for 
changes in outcomes only 
5 7 
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Country What was evaluated? What were the expectations? What were the effects? Source  
Austria 
Evaluation of 
Flexibilisierungsklausel, budget 
execution within a framework of 
performance agreements and targets. 
Agencification more generally. 
Federal administration level, various 
policy areas 
Increased managerial autonomy and use of 
performance targets and agreements would 
increase efficiency, effectiveness, 
innovation and professionalism 
 
Improved efficiency resulting from input 
reductions 
Deteriorated organizational stability  
Insufficient steering by parent ministries  
Improved agency-level management  
Increased savings (mostly staff 
reductions) Increased customer service 
Unchanged role of performance indicators 
in steering 
Hammerschmid et al., 
2008; Hammerschmid et 
al., 2012; Rossmann, 2001; 
Rossmann and 
Leitsmüller, 2010 
Agencification more generally in 
various policy areas 
Reduced transparency (shadow budgets)
 
Reduced parliamentary control of 
agencies 
Unchanged or at most minor 
improvements in efficiency and savings 
Reduced steering by parent ministries and  
internal control 
Rising cost of top executives 
Greiling, 2011 
Belgium 
 
 
Innovative culture of state agencies 
and factors influencing it.  
Agencification more generally 
affecting various policy areas  
Greater autonomy of agencies and 
increased control of results by parent 
ministry would foster innovation, 
specialization and expertize leading to 
performance improvements 
Unchanged innovative activity and 
behavior by state agencies. No significant 
differences in results found between 
Flanders and Norway 
Lægreid et al., 2011 
 
Comparative study 
covering Flanders and 
Norway 
Increased fragmentation in policy and 
management. Coordination decreased in 
all countries but to various degrees 
depending on the intensity of 
agencification (more in the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK and New Zealand than in 
Belgium and France)  
Bouckaert et al., 2010  
 
In addition to Belgium, it 
includes France, 
Netherlands, Sweden and 
the UK 
Diminished transparency stemming from 
high number of organizational forms 
Decreased policy cohesion, 
communication, collaboration and service 
Spanhove and Verhoest, 
2008 
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integration 
Improved innovative activity and 
behavior of state agencies 
 
Verhoest et al., 2007 
 
The performance of a Flemish 
employment agency 
 
Managerial autonomy, results control, 
financial incentives and competition would 
lead to agency performance 
 
Improved effectiveness of the job 
brokerage division but less so in the 
vocational training division 
Unchanged equal access – limited 
representation of hard-to-place job 
seekers 
 
Verhoest, 2005 
Evaluation of performance contracts 
between six Flemish agencies and the 
Flemish Government for 2008.  
Various policy areas. 
The introduction of performance contracts 
would make the control relationship 
between ministries and agencies more 
result-oriented 
Limited use of performance contracts for 
control  
Problematic quality of performance 
contracts, monitoring and evaluation 
processes 
Vlaams Parlement, 2009 
Evaluation of performance contracts 
for social security agencies 
Insufficient role played by the state in 
negotiating performance contracts, setting 
objectives and monitoring 
Rekenhof, 2005 
France 
 
 
Regional hospital agency of Brittany 
Setting up flexible 
decentralized/deconcentrated autonomous 
agencies would better respond to local 
needs. They were designed to have a 
regulatory role and were tasked to 
restructure the health system 
Tight central control of agencies, lack of 
managerial flexibility of agencies in 
negotiation 
Improved overall cohesion and common 
action 
Dumond and Jourdain, 
2006 
Creation of regional hospital agencies 
more generally 
Improved communication between 
agencies and stakeholders leading to 
improved accountability and transparency 
Improved professionalization of the 
management of regional agencies 
Improved service coordination 
Fargeon et al., 2002 
Unclear effect on equal access to services 
Unclear effects on cost containment and 
Minvielle, 2006 
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quality of service 
Hungary 
Agencies under the ministry level in 
various policy areas  
More complex than just the typical 
expectations of public choice theorists. It 
includes political reasons such as search for 
legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders 
Decreased organizational stability due to 
specialization and fragmentation  
Gyӧrgy, 2010 
Netherlands
 
 
 
Agencification more generally.  
Various policy areas 
Increase in managerial autonomy of 
executive agencies would lead to greater 
efficiency and responsiveness 
Improved managerial innovation 
Improved result-oriented steering  
Increased savings  
Lowered organizational stability 
Kraak and van Oosteroom, 
2002 
Norway 
 
 
Creation of a decentralized health 
model where a high degree of 
autonomy was granted to regional 
and local health units, called health 
enterprises 
The organization of hospitals as health 
enterprises with decentralized, semi-
autonomous management would improve 
efficiency and accountability through 
greater access to information. They would 
lead to lower bureaucracy and foster change 
Greater managerial and financial 
autonomy of hospitals  
Greater political control of health 
enterprises 
Lægreid et al., 2003 
Creation of single purpose 
organizations in  various policy areas 
more generally 
 
Reforms were driven less by economic 
reasons than in other countries and more by 
interest in becoming part of an international 
reform trend of autonomization  
Coordination, capacity and fragmentation 
problems 
Undermined central political control and 
weaker executive political leadership 
compared to agency leadership 
Christensen, 2001 
Christensen and Lægreid, 
2009 
Sweden 
 
 
Evaluation of the management by 
results model with a focus on 
agencification. Various policy areas 
Rational choice principles and expectations: 
disaggregation to create savings, improved 
efficiency and responsiveness.  
Enhanced understanding by ministries of 
the activities of agencies 
Improved awareness of agencies towards 
results 
Unclear and inadequate reporting 
requirements developed by ministries 
Poor link between inputs and outcomes 
Sundstrӧm, 2007 
United Kingdom
 
 
 
More general review of effects of 
agencification and NPM reforms in 
various policy areas 
In addition to the UK it includes 
examples from Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Canada, USA and South Korea 
Overall, rational choice principles and 
expectations: disaggregation to create 
savings, improved efficiency and 
responsiveness 
A statistical averaging of studies of the 
effects of agencification on efficiency 
finds efficiency ‘up’ in more cases than 
‘down’, but the largest category is 
‘unchanged’ 
Andrews, 2010 
 
The creation of executive agencies in The expectations were that greater Improved accountability of agency chief Office for Public Service 
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various policy areas of central 
government (Next Steps Programme) 
autonomy, within a framework of targets, 
would produce greater efficiency, improved 
customer focus, quality and professionalism 
in management and delivery of central 
government services 
executives for the achievement of targets 
within budgets due to framework 
agreements 
Improved  efficiency (but limited 
evidence) 
Improved cultural change that is focused 
management  
Greater gap between parent ministry and 
agency  
Loss of ministry-agency communication  
Increased difficulty in coordinating 
different agencies in order to serve cross-
cutting policies 
Policy coordination has become more 
difficult in some cases due to agencies 
pursuing their own targets too strongly 
Service integration has become more 
difficult  
Reform, 2002 
Improved accountability and transparency 
through framework agreements 
Unchanged efficiency 
Improved processes (such as processing 
claims) in some cases 
Increased customer focus culture in some 
cases 
Poor informational exchange affecting 
ministry-agency coordination  
James, 2003 
Evaluation of 12 service delivery 
organizations (agencies) in education, 
health and social housing. Greater 
autonomization of local service 
delivery 
The split between purchasers and providers 
was expected to foster competition, greater 
efficiency and customer responsiveness 
Some decline in access to public services 
Intensification of processes  
Increased fragmentation within the three 
sectors 
Pollitt et al., 1998 
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Table 4: Examples of effects of agency reform in Europe 
Agencification more generally 
covering four sectors: prisons, 
meteorology, forestry and social 
security and four countries: Finland, 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.  
Increasing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of executive operations through the creation 
of semi-autonomous agencies operating 
within contractual frameworks 
Somewhat enhanced accountability due to 
contractual frameworks and performance 
measures 
Enhanced transparency through more 
understandable annual reporting of 
agencies  
Improved performance (more generally as 
perceived by managers) 
Increasing availability of performance 
indicators (PIs) in all four countries but in 
the UK they were used more intensively 
and extensively than in the other three 
countries. However, little use of PIs as 
steering mechanisms by ministries in all 
countries 
Pollitt et al., 2004 
Pollitt, 2006 
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Mixed evidence on outputs and outcomes of agencification   
 
Although most of the convincing evidence only refers to changes in processes, a number of 
studies in our sample discuss effects of agencies on outputs and outcomes in various 
European countries, most notably in Austria, Belgium, France and the UK. Column “What 
were the effects? in Table 4 summarize these effects. A first notable example is the Austrian 
experience with agencification. External independent and academic evaluations – both of a 
decade ago and more recent – have found evidence on improved efficiency (Hammerschmid 
et al., 2008; Rossmann, 2001; Rossmann and Leitsmüller, 2010. These improvements are 
attributed to two main factors: i) improvements in management processes following an 
increase in autonomy and ii) a decrease in inputs consisting mostly of staff reductions. These 
findings are extremely interesting, but there is limited evidence of technical or X efficiency 
reflecting improvements in input-output ratios. With no or limited evidence on corresponding 
output levels, these efficiency improvements can best be described as savings or economies. 
Technical efficiency may have improved but there is simply not enough evidence to show that 
output levels improved, remained unchanged or decreased less than the level of inputs. 
However, overall, taking into account the evidence on processes, the Austria is among the 
most successful cases of the agency model – despite a number of unintended consequences as 
discussed in detail below. Another salient example refers to the creation of semi-autonomous 
regional hospital agencies in France. This was found to lead to improvements in transparency 
and accountability to various stakeholders including the public. The main factor explaining 
these positive effects is improved communication between agencies and stakeholders 
(Fargeon et al., 2002). However, no clear positive effects were found on cost containment, 
access to services or quality of healthcare (Minvielle, 2006). A case study evaluation 
concluded that the French regional healthcare agency model granted limited agency autonomy 
in the attempt to maintain central policy and service coordination and control. This decreased 
the negotiation power of regional agencies and managerial flexibility, but improved overall 
cohesion (Dumond and Jourdain, 2006). The UK studies of agencies evaluating the Next 
Steps Programme provide some evidence on changes in outputs and outcomes although the 
bulk of existing evidence refers to the processes of setting up and managing agencies. This 
includes improved accountability and transparency as a result of framework agreements and 
better reporting as well as changes in customer and result orientation and overall positive 
perceptions of performance (James, 2003; Pollitt et al., 2004; Pollitt, 2006). These findings 
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point to certain improvements in outputs and outcomes in a number of countries, but the 
picture is far more nuanced with evidence of trade-offs and consequences in other areas that 
were not part of the original model – this is a pattern that is not exclusive to outputs and 
outcomes alone but is also common as we shall see to changes in processes or activities. 
 
Positive effects of agencification on processes/activities   
There is considerable evidence on various effects of the creation of agencies on 
processes/activities, as shown in Table 4. Compared to what we know about the outputs and 
outcomes of agencification, the evidence on processes is more convincing and more readily 
attributable to agencification. The data point to certain improvements in various countries in 
the management and organizational culture of government bodies following an increase in 
agency autonomy compared to agencies with tighter subordinate relations. These 
improvements have taken various forms, including an orientation towards the needs and 
demands of service users as evidenced in the case of Austrian, Dutch and UK agencies 
(Hammerschmid et al., 2008; James, 2003; Kraak and van Oosteroom, 2002; Pollitt et al., 
2004; Pollitt, 2006; Rossmann, 2001). The management by results model promoted in 
Swedish agencies improved orientation towards results (Sundstrӧm, 2007). Similarly, 
improvements in the form of greater innovative activity were found in Flemish and Dutch 
agencies in various policy areas (Kraak and van Oosteroom, 2002; Verhoest et al., 2007). 
However,   evidence in this particular area is mixed with another study finding no significant 
improvements in innovation in Belgium and Norway (Lægreid et al., 2011). These findings 
show that in some Western European countries (specifically Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the UK) the creation of agencies has intensified and improved management 
processes as a result of greater managerial flexibility, and some evidence exists of cultural 
change with a greater emphasis on identifying service users’ needs and achieving results. This 
has not been the case, however, in those countries where agencies were granted limited 
autonomy. The French experimentation with setting up regional healthcare agencies is a case 
in point where tight central control left room for only limited managerial flexibility (Fargeon 
et al., 2002). The data seem to indicate that agency managers need to enjoy a high-enough 
degree of autonomy to ‘give them space’ to make decisions and incentivize them to think 
tactically and strategically to find ways to innovate and assume responsibility for 
performance.  
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Despite this pattern of positive effects of agencification, the data show that the effects of 
agencification have been more complex and nuanced, and not uniformly positive. A number 
of unintended consequences – ignored by the more optimistic proponents of agencification – 
are emphasized by the authors of the studies. This is a third pattern for which this review finds 
evidence. 
 
Unintended consequences: mixed and nuanced effects of agencification 
The main unintended consequences, identified by 13 studies (46% of the sample), consist of 
lowered organizational stability, diminished central coordination and increased fragmentation. 
Issues of national coordination in a context of agencification have been found in Austria (for 
example Greiling, 2011; Hammerschmid et al., 2008; Rossmann and Leitsmüller, 2010), 
Belgium (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Spanhove and Verhoest, 2008), Hungary (Gyӧrgy, 2010), 
the Netherlands (Kraak and van Oosteroom, 2002), Norway (for example Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2009) and the UK (James, 2003; Pollitt et al., 2004). Agency autonomy – depending 
on its degree – has created organizational incentives to improve performance, but it has raised 
challenges to coordination and performance of the whole system. Although agencification  
has not ‘invented’ the need for systemic coordination, processes of autonomization have 
reinforced it. The sample, however, points to limited empirical evidence documenting the 
effects of coordination problems. It readily describes the need for coordination following 
fragmentation in the public sector as a result of agency proliferation, but efforts to improve 
coordination need to be based on evidence on what negative effects these coordination 
problems have reinforced. This is an area where further research is needed especially in the 
current context where ‘joining-up’ policies are promoted in various European countries.  
A second unintended consequence concerns transparency and accountability. Seven studies in 
the sample (25%) have found evidence of either a decrease or – interestingly – an increase in 
accountability and/or transparency. For example in Austria, Greiling (2011) found that agency 
activity and leadership became less transparent due to the use of shadow budgets coupled with 
rising costs of top executives. Increased fragmentation, due to a large number of 
organizational forms in the agency landscape in Flanders, diminished transparency (Spanhove 
and Verhoest, 2008). In other countries, however, performance management and 
agencification enhanced accountability and transparency depending on the clarity and 
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comprehensiveness of reporting guidelines, frameworks and performance measures developed 
by ministries (for example Sundstrӧm, 2007 in the case of Sweden or see Pollitt et al., 2004 
and Pollitt, 2006 for evidence in various sectors in Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK). We see how these factors affect the ‘success’ of agencification in improving 
accountability and transparency. Reporting requirements of ministries on agency activity and 
performance need to be clear and understandable to improve agency-ministry communication.  
Poor information exchange, by contrast, can reinforce agencies to look “inwards” and pursue 
their own targets leading to a loss in central steering and coordination.   
 
Conclusions  
Agencification has been seen as a route to economies (input minimization) to more 
professional management (better processes), to greater efficiency (an improved input/output 
ratio), and to higher customer responsiveness and service quality (better outcomes). The 
evidence, however, becomes thinner the further one moves towards outcomes – we know 
much more about how the creation of agencies affected the internal relations within ministries 
than we do about how they actually changed service quality. A count of the type of effects 
evaluated in the sample indicates that relatively little is known about outcomes: that is effects 
outside the administrative system and the so-called ‘democratic effects’ – effects on 
legitimacy and accountability towards society (Van Thiel et al., 2012, pp. 432-435). Of the 
sample reviewed in this study, 36% includes some type of evidence on outputs, efficiency or 
outcomes. However, only 7% of these discuss outcomes.  
The empirical research across Western Europe reviewed here found evidence of 
improvements in the organization and management processes of agencies following an 
increase in managerial autonomy. Likewise, evidence exists of cultural change with greater 
interest and emphasis on achieving results and focusing on service users’ needs and demands. 
These two types of evidence seem consistent across policy areas and countries, and is one 
main pattern to which this review points. They show that agencification can and has led to or 
reinforced certain positive effects in the organization, management and delivery of public 
services. The issue is that little is known about what outcomes these positive developments 
have led to and whether they have much – or anything to do – with the creation, autonomy 
and management of agencies.  
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A second main pattern identified shows that the creation of agencies across European public 
sectors has led to nuanced and mixed effects with improvements in some areas, but also to 
insignificant changes or even deteriorations in other areas. A total of 46% of the sample found 
evidence of problems with organizational stability, fragmentation or coordination in a context 
of agencification. While this pattern is common across different European countries, these 
challenges varied depending on the intensity of agencification and the effectiveness of 
coordination mechanisms and instruments put in place to address fragmentation and 
coordination problems. This type of problems has by far been the most frequent identified in 
the reviewed sample. A second unintended consequence refers to concerns with 
accountability and transparency, but evidence is mixed with only two studies finding 
deteriorations in Austria and Belgium while six studies found evidence of improved 
accountability and transparency particularly in Sweden and the UK. Key factors that can 
facilitate the accountability and transparency of agencies lies in improved communication 
with stakeholders, both political and the public, clear and comprehensive exchange of 
information, guidelines and reporting requirements coupled with understandable contractual 
frameworks and performance measures.  
This paper has looked at the effects of agencification, and reviewed a sample of studies of 
agencies derived from the NPM literature. There are good reasons to do this. Agencification 
in a context of performance frameworks has been a key pillar of the NPM, and has spawned 
great interest for academics and practitioners alike. This is reflected in the number of studies 
of agencies – both single-country and comparative – that have been conducted in the past two 
decades. It needs to be acknowledged, however, that agencies have been created for other 
reasons and strands of literature other than NPM may well include evidence on the impacts of 
agencies. The goal here was to look at the NPM literature on agencies, and the sample 
reviewed here is based on a large database of studies of NPM, which systematically collected 
studies of NPM since the early 1980s across Europe. In this sense, it can be argued first that 
the net was cast wide enough by including in the sample a variety of studies across Europe. 
Second, by carefully reviewing 28 studies selected based on the strength of method and 
evidence provided, the article sought to identify nuances and possible patterns based on 
empirical literature that provided more convincing evidence of effects.   
The priority for future research into agencies should be the direct study of changes in outputs 
and, especially, outcomes. For the public these are the real ‘results’ of reform, but they have 
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been far less often studied than changes in organizational structures and processes. That, of 
course, is partly because they are more difficult to study practically and politically. Once 
created, agencies have undergone change in their organization and management as well as in 
the agency landscape. This has taken place in a context of cost cutting and achieving savings 
in the public sector which translated into reductions in the number of agencies, 
recentralization, and central steering and coordination efforts. A relevant second line of 
research into agencies is to document whether these changes to the ‘autonomizing’ agency 
model proved effective. Compared to the previous state of affairs, did they bring about the 
anticipated savings, improvements in quality and access to services? Did they improve 
outcomes or has there been a drop in outcomes, and if so, can they be convincingly attributed 
to changes in the original agency model? These questions form a second line of needed 
research into agencies.   
In conclusion, the picture of the effects of agencification is more nuanced than the proponents 
of agencification had originally envisaged. Unintended consequences received little 
consideration in the models that saw agencification as a panacea for various public sector ills. 
In this sense the evidence reviewed here challenges the original model of agencification 
proposed years ago by enthusiastic public choice theorists in the Anglophone world. In the 
current context of fiscal stringency with a growing interest in ‘joining-up’ initiatives and 
reductions in the number of agencies in various European countries, the ‘autonomizing’ 
model – the more disaggregation and the greater autonomy, the better – has already come 
under fire. This seems fair, but the challenge is not to transform, let us call it, 
‘deagencification’ in another yet know-it-all model. There are inherent trade-offs, paradoxes 
and unintended consequences, some of which are clear in this article, between granting 
organizational-level autonomy and centrally consolidating control. It can be expected that 
stronger central coordination at the expense of organizational autonomy may lead to 
disincentives to innovate and overall assume responsibility for decisions and results. There 
may well be a price that needs to be paid.  The question, however, is whether reforms of the 
agency model aimed at greater central control, coordination or steering at the expense of 
agency discretion, bring about savings and greater ‘systemic’ performance in the public sector 
compared to a disaggregated and autonomous agency model.  
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